Market mechanisms and state regulation have been brought in to replace direct control and planning, whilst the importance of state ownership has diminished through the effective privatisation of many State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) and the emergence of new private economic sectors and actors. Nevertheless, this does not mean that the state has withdrawn from economic activity. On the contrary, the state is alive and well and exercising considerable control over the nature of economic activity, albeit in different less direct ways than before. This is partly because state ownership remains dominant in key economic sectorsthe "commanding heights" of the Chinese economy remain largely under state control. But it's also because while the non-state sector in China might really be a "private" one, it is not always wholly "independent" from the state. To be sure this is not just a one way relationship -in divesting itself of ownership, the party-state helped create new economic actors and generate new interest that now influence the nature of Chinese industrial policy, macroeconomic control, and economic strategy in general. So what we have is a symbiotic relationship between private economic actors and the state (which often spawned the private actors in the first place).
It proceeds by first taking a very quick historical tour of the four key phases in the transition to socialism in China tracing the way in which the state retreated from direct control of most enterprises. Having then outlined the way in which the state at national and local levels exerts influence over key enterprises today, it concludes by using the example of the response to the global financial crisis as a means of showing how the state exerts control over economic activity using non direct forms, and the problems that this creates for the paradigm shift to a new model of economic activity that some in China's leadership think is long overdue.
A Brief History of Chinese Privatisation
Without wishing to go into any great details about the transformation of the Chinese economy since the onset of reform, it is perhaps worth very briefly outlining the main phases of change in the transition from socialism using a very blunt and at times arbitrary division of the postMao era into four periods. 2 The first phase was one of agricultural reform -an attempt to tinker with the existing agricultural system to make it work better. Initially at least, this was backwards looking rather than a forward move, in that the leadership looked backwards to Chen Yun's initial proposals for the second Five Year Plan in 1956 which were subsequently 2 To be more correct, it should be the post-Hua era. But Hua Guofeng's period of leadership from September 1976-December 1978 (formally until June 1981 but he effectively lost power in 78) is not usually considered to be part of the post-Mao epoch. So oddly, the post Mao era is typically dated as starting a full two years after Mao actually died.
swept aside by Mao's push for a more rapid pace of agricultural collectivisation that ended up as the Great Leap Forward. But once the status quo anti had been re-established, reforms gained their own momentum with famers pushing for greater freedoms and leading the drive to decollectivise. 3 Local experiments with different forms of rural responsibility systems (most notably in Anhui and Sichuan) 4 led to "responsibility" systems being rolled out nationally that allowed peasants to produce what they wanted guided by the market once they had fulfilled their commitments to the state. Crucially, though, the state (through the collective) retained ownership of the land.
With farmers selling their new surplus in the cities at newly established free markets, the state's monopoly on the pricing and distribution of agricultural produce was broken for the first time in decades. 5 Nevertheless, this first phase was overwhelmingly a rural phenomenon, and the second phase can be roughly dated from the decision to move the focus to urban industrial sectors and the "Decision on the Reform of the Economic Structure" in 1984. Here, the Chinese economy was characterised as a planned 'socialist commodity economy' shehuizhuyi shangpin jingji 社会主义商品经济 -an economy where the state still played the key leading role in guiding the drive towards industrialisation and economic modernisation, but where individual enterprises should take responsibility for profits and losses, and for meeting the economic demands of the people. In order to do this, the state began to cut the number of goods that were produced under mandatory plans and state set 3 Including resisting the imposition of the one child policy. The most extreme version of farmer power is provided by Kate Xiao Zhou (1996) organizations and 'no interference shall be allowed in the operation and management activities of a wholly foreign-owned enterprise' (Article 11).
Second, as workers left the land but were restricted through registration laws from migrating to the cities, around 100 million rural workers were absorbed by the creation of Township and Village Enterprises (TVEs) between 1984 and 1997 (when the TVE sector began to retract). 7 By the end of the decade, they were producing a quarter of industrial production, and brought in around a third of China's foreign exchange earnings. 8 Strictly speaking, these TVEs were not state owned under Chinese definitions ("owned by all the people" -quanmin suoyou 全民所有). But strictly speaking, neither were they private; partly because the concept of private ownership was slow in emerging and being legalised, and 7 simply economic means that could be used in both capitalist and socialist states to attain different goals. And in any case, while the law of value and non-state forms of ownership would play an ever greater role, SOES would remain "the leading force" in a national economy (Article 7).
In essence, this second phase entailed the facilitation and legitimating of the new without the eradication of the old. New types of activity emerged, and the commercialisation of existing SOEs was encouraged, but they were largely protected from competition that would put them out of business, and supported by the banks if they struggled. 12 Where I failed in my attempt to get the idea of an "embedded socialist compromise" into the discourse, Lau, Qian and Roland did much better with their idea of 'reform without losers'.
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The next third phase from around 1994 to 2004 entailed the attempt to build a new system of macroeconomic control based on law and regulation (rather than through state planning control under a guided market system) and a retreat from state ownership. particularly when it comes to potential privatisation of land (given all the problems that beset China the last time land was in private ownership). 21 Originally, the dominant form of such a transformation was through processes of worker buyouts, which took the burden of responsibility away from the state, whilst still being politically acceptable in a supposedly socialist society. 22 an organisation and an issue we will return to shortly. SASAC took over responsibility for the state's interests in SOEs as shareholder rather than as direct manager/owner/planner. The idea was to give enterprises the freedom to behave as commercial agents free from bureaucratic control, but without losing overall state ownership of key enterprises. Thus, for example, they are allowed to recruit the brightest and best to their ranks (even though, as Naughton points out, the CCP retains overall control of appointments). 32 This means that successful SOES were left in a position where they could behave as market actors but also retain the benefits that accrue from being part of the state sector. The need to put in place a new regulatory framework resulting from China's WTO commitments resulted in the distinction and bureaucratic separation of the regulation of internal and external trade coming to an end with 31 The Chinese term for this organisation is 国家发展和改革委员会. 国家 here can be translated as state or national, but although previous planning organisations were always known in English as "state", the NDRC is instead known as national. More recently, the focus has also turned to the role of Chinese companies overseas.
The main concern has related to the activities of large Chinese resource (particularly energy)
companies that have been seeking to obtain supplies across the world. In short, the argument here is that China's growing significance, its sheer size and global impact, and fears about China's (malign) intent mean that the nature of state control in China faces perhaps closer scrutiny than is the case with many other countries. Recognizing that this might be interesting, but ultimately perhaps peripheral to this paper (at best) it is time to move to more important issues. At the local level, many SOEs are smaller companies that do not necessarily have a global or even national presence, but which are nevertheless the lynchpin of local economies -companies that have access to markets (including market information) and capital and which receive preferential treatment from local governments that are not afforded to "outsiders" -including here outsiders from other local authorities within China itself. In combination, these enterprises are key determinants of daily economic activity in much of China, if not as powerful and significant on their own as the major centrally owned conglomerates.
State Control Beyond Direct Ownership
As already noted, it is not easy to get a full understanding of the extent of state ownership due to the way in which smaller companies have parents (including more than one parent) in the state sector. We have also seen how in terms of research and development, the state remains a key producer of knowledge and innovation that is used throughout the rest of the economy.
And this brings us to the extent to which the state can influence and at times even control the economy through indirect measures -responding to the global crisis in 2008 being a good case in point and as such will form a separate section at the end of this paper.
At the national level, like in Japan previously, China's leaders are keen to promote and support "national champions" in the global economy. Most of these putative champions are large companies that remain under degrees of state ownership and benefit from "normal" Moreover, even in supposedly encouraged sectors, the catalogue is full of conditions and clauses, and the full and detailed restrictions for each industry can only be found by referring to the specific laws and regulations for that industry. And it is in the interpretation of this regulatory confusion that many foreign actors think that the Chinese authorities are avoiding some of the commitments that they made to openness and liberalisation in joining the WTO. Notably, these regulations seem to be deployed selectively when overall economic trends dictate a move back from openness -as appears to be the case as China responded to the global economic crisis in 2008. In this respect, it is not that state support is always there on a daily basis, but that it provides some form of safety net for producers if and when the going gets tough.
And of course, we cannot ignore the state support provided to help Chinese exporters prosper. Exchange rate policy is a particular case in point here, and something that has been the source of considerable political debate and also political tension (between the US and China in particular) in recent times. In addition, many exporters negotiate tax deals to increase their profitability and to allow them to produce at margins that might not otherwise be commercially viable. When many of these breaks were removed in the summer of 2007, China's leaders faced a barrage of complaints from exporters in China's coastal provinces, and collectively spent their summers visiting those areas. As a result of the problems that these overwhelmingly private sector enterprises were facing, there was a retreat from the original policy in the summer of 2008 (before the impact of the global crisis began to hit China) and a reinstitution of support. Again, such state support is hardly unique to China, but the extent of state support for exporters over a long period does perhaps mark the Chinese case out as being different from the "norm".
Private but not independent?
Finally in this section, we return to the difficulty in identifying the exact relationship between individual enterprises and the state sector. It is not just a matter of the opacity of who owns what through overlapping and confusing share holdings and so on outlined above. Rather, the focus here is on the levels of dependence many private enterprises have, which makes them in some respects privately owned participants in the state sector.
In an early study of different ownership forms in China, Wank found that the official legal status of an enterprise was irrelevant -having a good relationship with local party state officials was much more important for doing business than the formal ownership classification of that enterprise. 55 Enterprises that were formally classified as "private" were often effectively dependent on local governments for financial help, and on local SOEs for supplies (at preferential rates) and often key personnel. This hand in glove relationship often emerged as enterprises were privatised, or as new private enterprises sprung up alongside existing state enterprises, benefiting from an advantageous relationship with the SOE as either supplier, or market, or both. This close relationship was helped by the way in which relatives of political officials were often the owners of new private entities, 56 with the long term success of these new enterprises continent on new owners' relationship with the local government. 57 In the process, it's fair to say that a number of officials used the opportunity to move state assets into private hands. 58 Times have moved on, and the legal status of private enterprises has been established.
So to has their theoretical right to access to finance and markets. Nevertheless, and notwithstanding liberalisation of most economic sectors and the dominance of "market" based levers of macroeconomic control, the state can (and indeed does) utilise a lack of transparency in market conditions and regulatory requirements, a flexible interpretation of fiscal responsibilities, and its authority over the financial system to support and protect favoured actors. Indeed, Chou goes as far as to suggest that the regulatory structure gives local authorities in particular the ability to control who is allowed to operate and who doesn't -and also allows the local governments to revoke these licences for not just economic reasons.
"when the institutional environment is relatively underdeveloped and when law enforcement is capricious and weak" as it is in China, then both ownership and connections matter. 62 In the literature debating whether TVEs were part of the state sector or not, three key features kept re-emerging to distinguish them from truly private enterprise;; they had special and preferred access to credit, benefited from trading relations with SOEs, and received support and protection from local governments not afforded to individual or private enterprises. 63 If we take this basic idea and bring it forward to the contemporary era, we can argue that this remains the case for a number of enterprises that are nominally in the private sector. They might not be formally part of the state sector, but again, they are not wholly independent from the state, and benefit from the protection and support of the state -and this relationship with the state is "qualitatively different and deeper than that of their counterparts in capitalist countries." 
Responding to the Global Crisis and State-Industry Relations
It is not possible here to give a full overview of how China responded to the impact of the global financial crisis in 2008; nor is it entirely clear what the long term consequences of this response will be. But before moving to the conclusion, it is worth spending a few words on the response to the crisis as it reveals the extent to which the state can mobilise the economy when it needs to; and also the problems that the central state has in controlling the authority of local state actors.
With the global crisis resulting in a collapse in demand for Chinese exports, the government responded in two ways. First, on 9 th November, it announced a RMBB4 trillion stimulus package. On closer inspection, it turned out that some of the fund had previously been pledged as part of the Sichuan earthquake recovery strategy, and that the central government was only committed to funding around a quarter of the total, with the remainder expected to be provided by local governments. 67 In the process, the central government not only took the shackles off local government spending, but at the same time loosened credit controls and urged banks to expand liquidity.
Effectively, local governments were being told to take their share in boosting the economy without being given the resources to do so. In response, local governments utilised First and second, as already noted, on one hand it shows the state's ability to mobilise the key levers of the financial system in support of political objectives; but on the other hand, it also shows the key role that local governments play, and the significance of local level government-enterprise relations (via local investment companies). Indeed, local protectionism seems to have increased with "buy local" projects instituted in a number of provinces and municipalities to try to make up for some of the decline in export markets, and Finally, the response to the crisis seems to have been largely (and disproportionally) based on the state sector. This is partly because of the expansion of infrastructure spending, where state owned enterprises are pretty much the only game in town. But it also seems that non-state SMEs found it difficult to get access to money to tide them through the decline in export markets even during this period of expansive bank lending. Indeed, in the second half of 2009, the idea of guojin mintui 国进民退 or "the expansion of the state, and the retreat of the private" began to gain increased attention in China. This was partly because of the above mentioned disparity in access to bank loans, which strengthened the state sector whilst leaving some private SMEs with nowhere to go other than bankruptcy. 72 But it was also because of an increase in acquisitions of private companies by state enterprises -including the acquisition of some of those that were finding it difficult to get other forms of funding to survive.
The official position is that this is nothing to do with ownership, but simply a result of the strong taking over the weak, combined with changes to rules that allow, for example, 
Conclusions
Of course, China is far from unique in trying to deal with the global financial crisis by turn back to the state to get through the turmoil and it will take a lot of time in China and elsewhere for the full implications of the crisis (and the responses to the crises) to become clear. On one hand the evidence to date suggests a strengthening of state power in China and a retreat from the private sector. On the other, there have been commitments to increasing the scope of the private sector from the very top of the political system, as more and more loans become non-performing, then the need to engage the private sector to keep the economy going. But then again, if we had a third hand, we could discuss the way in which the appeal of liberal economics has been somewhat undermined by the crisis.
Perhaps the response to the crisis in China tells us three things. First, the state still has the ability to mobilise the economy behind its objectives when it needs to. In this respect, state power is more latent than an everyday phenomenon. Second, the financial system is in some ways more important than ownership. And third, when we speak of the state in China, we need to disaggregate our perspectives and consider different levels of state authority -and in doing so, also consider the way that the interest and actions of the local state can actually run counter to the goals and ambitions of central state leaders. Before finishing, and in the knowledge that this will probably be revised out of the final version, two final points are worth raising that haven't really been addressed in the paper. The first is the extent to which economic debates and policy changes in China take place under the under the umbrella of the wider "national project". Deng Xiaoping argued that
The fundamental difference between socialism and capitalism does not lie in the question of whether the planning mechanism or the market mechanism plays a larger role.
[The] planned economy does not equal socialism, because planning also exists in capitalism; neither does [the] market economy equal capitalism, because the market also exists in socialism. Both planning and market are just economic means. 76 But means to what end? The answer is China's glory -the return of China to its rightful place of global power (and maybe even supremacy). Underpinning all that follows is the importance of the "national" element of China's national capitalism. This is much more than just the idea that there is a distinctive and distinctly Chinese type of capitalism that is built on a unique set of Chinese conditions (as opposed to the universal application of a single capitalist form). From the onset, the need for reform of the Chinese economy has been justified in nationalist terms. 77 Indeed Gallaher argues that this appeal to nationalism explains why the breaking of the old socialist social contract was accepted by China's workers
(compared to what happened when the same social contract was torn up in Eastern Europe). 78 This argument perhaps understates the extent to which many Chinese workers were far from happy to sacrifice their own fortunes for the national cause, and the extent of mass demonstrations against the closure of state enterprises, the non-payment of benefits and so 
